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Terrorist activities in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, 
have impacted negatively on the security, socio-political and economic situations in the region. 
This paper investigates the evolution of insurgency and the factors leading to its growth in the 
region. It also examines its socio-political, economic and security implications. Nigeria, in the 
centre of the imbroglio, has had no respite from terrorist activities for a long time. Boko Haram 
has carried out many gun attacks and bombings in many strategic places, including the United 
Nations building in Abuja, the federal capital city. There have been similar attacks in Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger, including a massive attack in Bosso in the Niger Republic with 26 soldiers 
killed in 2016. This article concludes that the wave of terrorism in the subregion has a 
connection to the wave of global terrorism. To stem the tide of insurgency in the subregion, this 
paper recommends that governments at all levels should create enabling environment for 
investment and industrial growth. It also suggests that security of lives and properties should be 
given utmost priority. This paper examines the evolution, manifestations, and course of the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the subregion, exploring the implications for national and international 
security, socioeconomic order, political stability, and sustainable development of the area. It will 
suggest ways to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency and probable future insurgencies in the 
subregion.  
 





Boko Haram Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin Region 41 
 
The global incidence of terrorism has increased alarmingly since September 11, 2001. 
The concerted efforts embarked upon by the international community to ensure its elimination 
have been noted but have hitherto proved inadequate. This increase is not unconnected with the 
balance of terror and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the beginning of the 21st century; 
it is the product of unresolved issues of the Cold War and the continuation of the ideological war 
between the west and the Islamic fundamentalism. Africa, and indeed Nigeria, have in the past 
decade been bedevilled by an increased incidence of insurgencies, recording a high level of 
destruction of both property and lives. The most recent rebellion in the Lake Chad Basin Area is 
the Boko Haram uprising which emanated from Nigeria in July 2009. Other examples of the 
terror siege on Nigeria and Africa in general were the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s in 
Nigeria, the Al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which is a menace to peace 
and security in the region. Since the advent of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, the security 
situation has been in a state of confusion.  
Since 2009, Boko Haram has attacked the Northeast of Nigeria, capturing territories and 
spreading to some parts of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. 
Nigeria started an onslaught on Boko Haram at the onset of its activities in the Northeast; 
however, before the formation of the joint task force by the Lake Chad Basin regional 
authorities, the activities of the sect had spread to neighbouring countries. Apparently the 
terrorists targeted these countries for attacks in retribution for their participation in the regional 
joint task force and for daring to support Nigeria’s efforts in quelling the insurgency (Enobi and 
Johnson-Rokosu, 2016: 25-41). The cost of combating the attacks and defeating the terrorist 
group has been confounding and has already taken its toll on the LCB. Fighting the scourge of 
terrorist war in the LCB has been monumental for an impoverished region that for years had 
been struggling with deforestation and other human activities due to climate change. 
Boko Haram, according to Anyadike (2013) set not only a precedent but also 
strengthened an attempt by the Nigerian Islamic conservative elements to impose a different 
Islamic religious ideology on a secular Nigerian state in particular. Other insurgencies in the 
subregion include the Tuareg rebellion of 2007-2009 led by the Sahara Desert Tuaregs of 
northern Mali and the Niger Republic. Chad has been inundated with a series of crises such as 
the Chadian civil war of 2005-2010, which has created a mass of disgruntled elements in that 
country. These disgruntled elements have served as a reservoir for recruitment for insurgency 
groups. Cameroon has been relatively peaceful, with a major exception being the February 2008 
uprising due to a hike in fuel prices at the pump in that country. The aftermath of this unrest has 
left scars that must be managed by the government. Without the support of the international 
community and international antiterrorist agencies, such as the European Union, the region might 
not be able to defeat the scourge of terrorism. The situation has been compounded where such 
uprisings came with a level of political undertone, such as the accusation that trailed the 
emergence of Boko Haram at the onset. In Nigeria, the sitting government between 2011 and 




The development of societies to meet the needs of the people for peaceful coexistence has 
been dynamic to the extent that for many decades, issues relating to security have taken center 
stage. In other words, development process has been preoccupied with the discourse on how 
societies should function for the benefit of its people. The notion of security is not a new 
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phenomenon. Even in primitive societies, it has always remained a central issue in the discourse 
on the social relationships in which people willingly surrender their rights to ensure peaceful 
coexistence. 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a paradigm shift from the former state-
centric perspective which emphasizes military and economic power rather than the pursuit of 
ideals or ethics. This state-centric view is intended to satisfy the needs of the nation-state and its 
institutions rather than the interest of the citizenry. Today’s view is more pragmatic and places a 
premium on human security with the main thrust on issues relating to human rights and 
individual security, and from military to non-military issues (Krahmann, 2003:9). It is to be 
noted that the military should not undertake national security issues dealing with matters such as 
the economic basis for strategic forces, problems of structural system maintenance, and other 
related security issues belonging to the domain of other agencies of government. Societies, 
therefore, adopt an inclusive definition of security that takes into consideration all aspects of 
state functions, which can lead to a dysfunctional situation if neglected. The contemporary 
concept of security analysis is, therefore, a far cry from the old belief that national security 
resides solely with the military. Social issues that directly impact on the citizenry are more 
germane in the modern conception of security. These social issues include protection of 
fundamental rights and maintaining a nonviolent environment, healthy living, freedom from 
socioeconomic and political exploitation, and protection from environmental threats. 
Although the complexities involved in the concept of security are enormous, the most 
important issue here is that the term and its understanding show that it is vital for national 
cohesion, peace and sustainable development. Igbuzor (2011:2), therefore submits that security 
forms a condition that ensures safety from harm, the defense and protection of the populace, and 
absence of threats. Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) opine that security is the ability of a nation to 
ensure that its people are free from danger or threats to develop their potential, engage in 
promoting their cherished values, enhance their well-being and pursue legitimate interests under 
an atmosphere conducive to doing so.  
Ensuring internal security for the promotion of core values and socio-political and 
economic development must therefore be the primary objectives of the government. In 
furtherance of this objective, therefore, national security that avoids desecration of the nation’s 
core values and prevents violent conflicts is a desideratum for economic growth and 
development of any country and must be embraced. In other words, security is vital to 
maintaining peace for the socioeconomic and political development of a nation, and the attempt 
to prevent violent conflict either originating from within or outside the state must be vigorously 
pursued (Stan, 2004: 2). Despite the continued presence of terrorism in international and 
domestic life, there is currently no concise, universally accepted definition of the term or of who 
we should regard as a terrorist. Therefore, the concept remains a global enigma. The argument 
put forward by Anger (2002) therefore suffices with its contention that a definition of terrorism 
has been contested due to political sentiments attached to it rather than semantics. From this 
perspective, the description of terrorism may depend on the political divides to which one 
belongs or to the institution applying the term, as well as the current situation. The duo of Nelson 
Mandela and Yasser Arafat were once described as terrorists by the United States but were later 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This demonstrates that the term “terrorism” can be highly 
controversial as well as political. 
 
 The main issue here is that every party has defined the term to suit its motive or purpose. 
Ruby (2002: 9-14) however,
 
reasons that semantic vagueness has resulted in difficulty to define 
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the phenomenon and the inability of scholars to have a consensus on its definition. Ruby went 
further to state that researchers on terrorism tend to use the same term to refer to a wide range of 
events. In this context, people have described terrorism as killing innocent people, shootings in 
public places by a lone gunman, and as a violent attack by the state. Looking at this description, 
it seems that there are many characteristics of terrorism, but scholars tend to pick the aspects 
most suitable to them when researching it. Terrorism characterised by violence is a disturbing 
phenomenon which is not new in human history. What differentiates the violence in terrorism 
from other types of violence such as that used against soldiers in defense of the state is that 
innocent civilians are mostly targeted. The idea behind such acts against civilians is to cause 
terror or panic among the civil population, and of course, to render the state ungovernable. 
Omar Lizardo (2008:91-118) however, sees terrorism as a “premeditated use or threat of 
use of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain political, religious, or 
ideological objectives through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved in 
the policy-making that the terrorists seek to influence.” It would not be out of place to argue that 
the definition of terrorism is replete with dimensional semantics. Malden, (2004)
 
defines 
terrorism as an asymmetrical warfare of threat and violence targeted against enemies by 
deploying unconventional means not within the forms of political struggle routinely operating 
within some current regime. This symbolism is reflective of the European Union’s definition that 
terrorism is geared to intimidate the population or to compel a government to unduly carry out or 
abstain from performing a particular act, or to cause a major political social or constitutional 
order to destabilise the polity.
 
Thus, these perceptual differences will linger on for a long time to 
come because of the imprecise nature of terrorism. 
 
Factors Responsible for Terrorism in the Region 
 
For several years, there have been scholarly analyses on security challenges as well as the 
links between them and many grievances, such as marginalization, resource control, 
unemployment, religious intolerance, and neglect of educational and health sectors. These factors 
have heightened the spate of insecurity and insurgency in the subregion, including the 
militarization of the entire political landscape by the military dictatorship that ruled for several 
years in the area. The military regimes that dominated the region for several years lack the 
capacity to develop the area, hence the case of millions of jobless youths. Money meant for 
development was shipped out of the region by military leaders to their families living in various 
European countries. The leadership of the military juntas also used misappropriated funds to buy 
properties in choice cities around the world, rendering their countries impoverished. As a result, 
there were no resources for the development of the region. Thus, it is argued that in developing 
nations one of the root causes of terrorism is poverty.  
A statistical distribution of poverty in Nigeria shows that northern Nigeria is more deeply 
affected, with the North-Central States recording 67% poverty levels, North-West States at 
71.1%, and North-East States 72.2% (Danjibo, 2011). It would not be out of place to suggest 
therefore that poverty is so prevalent in Northern Nigeria as a result of injustice, lack of fairness 
in policy, negligence on the part of the political class to develop education in that region, and an 
imbalance in resource allocation. Unfortunately, this pervasive poverty plays out in a region that 
historically had a culture derived from well-organised Islamic wars (Ahokegh: 2012). The 
conspiracy between the colonial authority and the Nigerian elites at the inception of colonial 
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administration through indirect rule has also impacted negatively on Nigerian sociopolitical 
landscapes, especially in the north. Sanusi (2007: 181) has opined that:  
One of the consequences of the alliance between the British and the emirates was that the 
integrity of the political and social structures in the north could only be achieved by 
sealing the region off from Western influences, including from southern Nigeria. In an 
attempt to insulate the north from modernity, Western education was severely curtailed in 
order to prevent in the north what Lord Lugard termed the “utter disrespect” for British 
and natives’ ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south. 
The northern part of Nigeria has therefore produced millions of uneducated elites who 
could not understand why the security of a nation should be taken as a serious issue. It was not 
surprising then that many of the youths who were jobless were a ready market for the recruitment 
by the Boko Haram insurgents. The return of Nigeria to democratic rule after many years of 
military dictatorship in 1999 was ushered in with high hope by Nigerians and the international 
community for rapidly increased democratisation and socioeconomic development. This 
expectation was not unfounded because democracy is about good governance. It is, however, 
unfortunate that after 15 years of democratic rule in Nigeria, the country has not reaped the 
dividend of democracy. In all respects, the Fourth Republic of Nigeria has been a paradox 
(Unumen and Oghi, 2016).  
The situation is not better in Chad, where about 11 million live in abject poverty. Since 
independence, Chad has experienced social unrest, political instability, and conflicts with 
neighbouring Sudan. These conflicts have destabilised the country’s infrastructure and, combined 
with an unstable government, have led to a dire humanitarian situation. The Global Development 
Report 2007 asserts Chad as the seventh poorest country in the world, and poverty is said to 
affect 55% of the population, especially in the rural areas. The challenges of the wars in the 
countries contiguous to Chad have compounded the situation as refugees from the Central 
African Republic and IDPs from Sudan further overstress the already lean infrastructure on the 
ground.  
Western nations are believed to be peaceful and developed because of democratic culture 
that brings about equal distribution of wealth, enables good governance and fast-track 
development. The failure of improving on the livelihood of the people has brought much 
discontent and an attitude of revolt from Nigerians, Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigeriens who 
expected better opportunities than they have received. People believe that the governments of 
these countries have undermined, under-developed and impoverished the vast majority of the 
peoples.   
Insecurity continues to spread in these countries because of the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons (SALW). Many West African countries have fought intra-state wars in which 
small arms were the primary weapons. The disarmament of the combatants in these conflicts was 
haphazardly done during demobilisation. It makes these weapons available to many people who 
are not supposed to be in possession of arms. The availability of such weapons in the hands of the 
wrong people has also impacted negatively on security in the Lake Chad subregion. The arms 
illegally smuggled into the area through the unpoliced, porous borders have been used to commit 
crimes against the state. One is therefore constrained to say that Boko Haram must have gotten 
some of the weapons for its operations from this source. In this instance, Edeko (2014) has 
observed that Nigeria alone is estimated to host over 70% of about 8 million illegal weapons in 
the West African subregion due to the porosity of Nigerian borders. In Chad, procurement of 
arms has heightened conflict in that country and facilitated human rights abuses. There is a risk in 
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this because some of these arms smuggled out of government control into private hands are used 
to cause confusion, and some transferred to the war-torn Darfur assist the rebels there. It is 
estimated that importation of weapons by Chad was five times higher in 2004–2008 than in 
1999–2003 (Wezeman, 2009).   
Other factors that have contributed to the heightening of insecurity and insurgency in the 
subregion include the militarization of the entire political landscape by the military dictatorship 
that has ruled the countries for several years. In the seventies and eighties many of the West 
African countries went through various military dictatorships that did little or nothing to develop 
the region. In Cameroon, stay-put leadership has been a bane of development. Paul Biya, the 
president, has been in government for more than three decades. The challenges that trailed this 
development were lack of basic infrastructure, lack of employment for the youths, lack of 
transparency and accountability, mismanagement of public funds, and poverty. The availability 
of the jobless youths became commonplace in the region. Therefore, at the onset of every 
insurgency, the youths are always available to be engaged by the insurgents.  
Contrary to widely believed notions that democracy is beneficial to peace, Omilusi, M. 
(2016:2) contends that democracy in Africa has increased the culture of impunity in some 
people, while political differences have fuelled some of the violence that has erupted. The 
frequent occurrence and manifestation of ethno-religious conflicts with the institutionalization of 
democratic culture in Nigeria might be due to the democratic institutions’ and elected leaders’ 
failure to mitigate communal tensions and, in many instances, their exacerbation of conflict for 
political gains. Thus, there is the need to be concerned about the impact of religious tensions on 
Nigeria’s fragile democracy, as the growth and manifestation of democratic culture cannot thrive 
in an atmosphere of disharmony.  
 
Boko Haram Terror in the Lake Chad Basin 
 
The exact date of emergence of the Boko Haram sect is not known. The only relative 
facts about this sect are the accounts gathered from the media and scant extant academic 
documentations. However, according to Onuoha (2010: 54-67), the emergence of Boko Haram 
can be traced to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Allusunna wal’jama’ah hijra sect 
in the University of Maiduguri. Lawan then left the country for studies in Saudi Arabia at the 
University of Medina and since then nothing has been heard about him. The sect gradually 
developed, spreading to Adamawa, Bauchi, and Yobe, and eventually could be found not only in 
many parts of northern Nigeria but also in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon and 
Niger. The sect continued to move about with its slogan that Western education and civilisation 
are sinful. The sect has concentrated on destroying government establishments because it 
believes that the government imposes Western education on it, and it blames the government for 
not managing the resources of the state for the benefit of the people.  
Notwithstanding the conflicting accounts about the origin of the sect, most observers 
agree that a 32-year-old charismatic Muslim cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, established the sect 
in 2002. The same account states that Yusuf also established a religious complex with a mosque 
and Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri, Borno. A prayer group called “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda’awati wal Jihad,” loosely translated from Arabic as “people committed to the propagation 
of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Chothia, 2011), was part of his legacy towards the 
development of the sect. Since then the sect has flourished under various names like the Nigerian 
Taliban, Yusufi yah sect, and Boko Haram. The name “Nigerian Taliban” is a derogatory name 
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used to disparage the teachings and philosophy of the group. Though the actions and mode of 
behaviour of the sect are fashioned after those of the Taliban in Afghanistan, there are no 
accepted facts that they are affiliated (Onuoha, 2010). 
The meaning of Boko Haram is literally: “Western education is forbidden.” The 
ideological mission of Boko Haram is not in doubt. It clearly declared that it was to overthrow 
the Nigerian state and impose a strict Islamic Sharia legal system in Nigeria. It was the 
conviction of members of the sect that there were so many social vices in Nigeria that only an 
Islamic legal system was capable of eradicating them. Boko Haram membership was drawn from 
undergraduates, unemployed graduates, the unemployable, the underemployed, some extreme 
radical Muslims, and the Almajiris (a group of young people, male and female, who search for 
knowledge at home or in transit and display high moral behavior). The graduates are required to 
show their loyalty and commitment by burning their degrees as part of their indoctrination, as 
required by the movement (Njoku, 2011).
 
The followers were, however, not restricted to Nigeria, 
as foreigners from neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, and Niger also joined. 
While there is no doubt that the subregion has witnessed a series of threatening security 
challenges, the activities of the Islamist sect—Boko Haram—remain unique in all ramifications. 
The sect has demonstrated an unparalleled impunity of the highest order by openly claiming 
responsibility for several bombings and sniper activities in northern and central Nigeria, thereby 
placing the nation at the threshold of disintegration as suspicion and accusations between 
Muslims and Christians continued to rage. The level of terror and destruction that Boko Haram 
has unleashed on Nigeria has been devastating. The pattern of Boko Haram’s devastation and the 
destruction arising from it has invariably undermined peace and security, not only in the country 
but also in the Lake Chad Basin.   
 
Implications of the Insurgency to Subregional Security 
 
Boko Haram’s violent conflict in the Lake Chad Basin has continued. There are constant 
raids and suicide bombings, creating fears and widespread trauma for people and preventing 
them from assessing basic essential services, and damaging infrastructure. The Lake Chad Basin 
harbors about 21 million inhabitants from Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These people are 
among the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. There has been the mind-boggling scenario of 
food insecurity, and malnutrition has gotten to a critical level (UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2016). The territorial integrity of any nation is treated with reverence, and 
no nation can afford to do otherwise. Without proper security to maintain territorial integrity, 
every aspect of human endeavor, be it health, environment, food, economy, politics, or the social 
and or physiological, stands to be greatly affected by the security or insecurity of that nation. In 
recent times, the Lake Chad security environment has been bogged down with challenging 
security issues championed by the Boko Haram insurgency. These terror attacks have had 
negative implications for the socioeconomic and political health, as well as the security, of the 
Lack Chad region. 
The effect of Boko Haram terror on the security of the area cannot be overemphasised. 
People are now being denied their fundamental human rights and cannot exercise freedom of 
movement or worship for fear of being attacked by members of the sect. The planting and 
carrying of explosives has been a common method of the sect. The most dangerous of the 
activities of Boko Haram is the conscription of young boys and girls, who have been 
brainwashed to believe that their heaven is assured if they die in the process of “fighting for 
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Allah.” Sometimes they are even put under the influence of dangerous drugs to perform these 
heinous acts. Boko Haram has created fear in the minds of the people. Churches and mosques 
were bombed while people were worshipping. The almost simultaneous bomb explosions at St. 
Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state; Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church in Jos, 
Plateau state; and Gadaka in Yobe state on Christmas day 2011 are still fresh in memory (Allen 
and Silver, 2011).  
Boko Haram has also put the military to shame and revealed its inadequacies. The 
security situation became so precarious that the Nigerian leadership became suspicious of the 
incompetence of their military commanders. This suspicion has led to their regular replacement. 
The inadequacies and incompetence allegations were validated by Air Chief Marshal Alex 
Badeh, former Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who was quoted as saying that “the 
military he headed lacked adequate equipment to fight Boko Haram.” Boko Haram has plunged 
its area of operation into long-time insecurity and danger. Troops of the Nigerian Army have 
reported cases of mines along the routes frequented by people, which only military engineers 
have the technical knowledge to breach. It is, however, doubtful if the Nigerian Army engineers 
have such sophisticated modern equipment. However, the defense spokesman, Major General 
Chris Olukolade, has denied this allegation. In a report carried by Reuters (Abdallah, 2015), a 
soldier was quoted as saying, “soldiers have retreated to Bama because of mines. They had been 
on the road but that made them vulnerable, so they moved to the bush, but there are mines 
planted there [too].” A member of a local vigilante group, Muhammad Mungonu, corroborated 
the soldier’s statement as he said, “Three of our boys were killed by a landmine as we progressed 
into Sambisa. We have suspended going farther” (Abdallah, 2015). An additional issue with 
mines is that even after hostilities have ended, these mines will remain dangerous to the 
inhabitants of the area. Europe and Asia are still grappling with mine-contaminated 
environments long after the Second World War. Busé (2000) has contended that:  
Explosives and mines from WWI and WWII still turn up on European and 
Asian construction sites, backyard gardens, beaches, wildlife preserves and 
former military training grounds . . . these discoveries are not isolated 
incidents but are the result of hastily cleared ammunition dumps, training 
ground, bombings and mine fields from these wars. 
Another critical security issue is that hoodlums and other criminal gangs have hijacked 
the situation to perpetrate their nefarious activities. Kidnapping has increased in the areas 
affected by the insurgency. The case is assuming a dangerous dimension as criminal gangs have 
taken advantage of the situation by planting bombs and kidnapping and killing innocent people 
in the affected areas.  
The Boko Haram insurgency has also exposed the security lapses of security outfits in the 
subregion, especially those involved in information gathering. It has shown that the security 
agencies are not adequately equipped with enough apparatus to gather information on impending 
attacks to nip them in the bud. These lapses account for these agencies not being proactive 
enough to expose planned attacks by the insurgents before they take place. The attacks on 
institutions such as various police stations and the United Nations building in Abuja, or the 
kidnapping of the Chibuk girls, were a result of this weakness.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the causes of insurgency in Nigeria has been the massive 
unemployment facing youths, which has provided a ready market for recruitment for the sect in 
the subregion. Illiteracy compounds the already bad situation, a result of negligence in education 
from the successive governments of the political elites of that part of West Africa. The situation 
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has led to the closure of schools and the collapse of business activities in the region. Boko Haram 
terrorism has resulted in a drastic reduction in economic investment in the subregion. For 
instance, experts once described former President Goodluck Jonathan’s economic reforms as an 
effort that may yield no result because of the pervasive woes in security in the country. It is 
pertinent to mention that no serious business organisation will risk coming to invest in a 
turbulent environment. In the wake of the crisis in the country, many international agencies and 
countries began to issue travel warnings to their citizens about the dangers involved in visting 
and doing business in some parts of the country. The government of the United States fired the 
first shot of warning to its citizens about the risks of going to Nigeria. In particular, Akwa Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Abia, Edo, Imo, Jos, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, and Borno states, as well as 
the Gulf of Guinea (Carson, 2012), were identified as hot spots. This situation has had grave 
consequences for the economic development of the country, as the insurgency has further 
damaged Nigeria’s profile as a desirable destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, 
and migration.  
Furthermore, terrorism in the region has created uncertainty in business activities in the 
country. Most foreigners willing to invest in Nigeria are now afraid to come to the country for 
good and sustainable business engagements. The attacks of Boko Haram have caused a severe 
drought in economic and commercial activities, as business activities are almost at a standstill. 
Commercial banks now do brisk business, as they have reduced their working duration from 
eight hours to just three. Awojobi (2014: 144-150), has opined that the frequent bombings and 
clashes between the insurgents and the security agents have weighed heavily on the commercial 
and business activities in the region, while many people have fled the area. In some locations, 
business activities were paralysed. The spate of insecurity trailing the activities of Boko Haram 
in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria has greatly stressed and imperilled a growing commercial 
chain that was instrumental in the cooperation and integration process, which was the vision of 
the founders of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in a fast globalising 
economic and political order.  
The economic impact of terrorism on security is, therefore, multifaceted. Investors 
naturally evade areas perceived to be a potential source of terrorist attacks. In Borno and Yobe 
states in the North-East, Nigeria, the people that go to the fish and beans markets have dwindled 
due to fear of attack by terrorists. Apenda and Tough (2015) noted that farmers who produce 
onions, rice, maize, livestock, pepper, and fish have all fled the Lake Chad region. Baga market, 
known for fish trading, has been forced to close for security reasons. The effect of the closure of 
these markets on food safety is unprecedented as neighbouring states also felt the scarcity of the 
items, which resulted in the increase of prices of these food items. The strategy of violence of the 
Boko Haram has also caused the massive displacement of people of large-scale agricultural and 
fishing communities from their original habitat to other settlements. These displaced people were 
responsible for the production of essential materials needed for exchange in the international 
trade relations among the adjacent neighbours in the region (Awodola and Ayuba, 2015).   
The Boko Haram insurgency has reportedly forced not less than 1.5 million people out of 
their homes to seek safety in other parts of the country. Another 150,000 have also taken refuge 
in neighbouring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Although Nigeria ratified the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Africa on 
April 17, 2012 (AUCPAIDP, 2012), as of April 2016 the federal cabinet had yet to adopt the 
policy, despite persistent advocacy on the issue. The IDPs, therefore, continue to live in cramped 
and unhygienic conditions. The most vulnerable IDPs—the young, older people and those with 
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disabilities—are most at risk and have been significantly affected by the spread of poliovirus. In 
2012, there was a significant reduction in the spread of polio in Nigeria; however, in 2014, 
Nigeria experienced an increased outbreak of type 2 poliovirus (cVDPV2) with 29 cases across 
five states. The distribution of these cases are: 14 cases in Borno, 10 cases in Kano, two cases in 
Yobe, one case in Katsina, and two cases in Jigawa, up from five cases in 2013 (NPHDA, 2015:  
4). The increase in the outbreak of this disease followed restricted access to the area for health 
workers, caused by the fear of being attacked by insurgents. This situation has become a great 
concern to Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, which have declared the situation a health 
emergency that requires quick attention to stem its global spread (UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).  
Apart from the epidemiological disaster confronted by IDPs, they also, in the long run, 
face severe trauma due to extended stays in unsuitable environments. The result of this can be 
multi-dimensional. They could become destitute after returning from displaced persons’ camps 
and never go back to normal life. Research on the conditions of IDPs has shown that IDPs are 
targets of violence or pawns in military conflict and face armed attacks, killings, abductions, 
injuries, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). All of these effects are a common 
phenomenon in IDP camps in this area. In addition, Boko Haram’s insurgency has drastically 
affected the tourism industry in the subregion. According to research conducted by Adejoh and 
Fada (2014), terrorist attacks have reduced the number of tourists visiting the countries affected 
by terrorism. The report indicated the cancellation of many national and international events in 
these geopolitical zones. For instance, the Nigerian premier leagues between different clubs 
within the country faced a setback, as clubs from the southern part of Nigeria were unwilling to 
go to places like Jigawa, Bauch, and Kano, located in the north, for their matches. The 
insurgency also led to the cancellation of an international football match between the Nigeria 
Super Eagles and their Samba Boys counterparts from Brazil in 2012. Nigeria, being a football-
loving country, lost much due to these cancellations.  
The north east of Nigeria also houses the famous Yankari game reserve and the Mambila 
Plateau, which used to attract tourists and investors from different parts of the world before Boko 
Haram’s insurgency. These tourist centers have lost a great deal in the wake of Boko Haram, 
leading to unemployment as employees abandoned their various duty posts for fear of being 
attacked. In Cameroon, Boko Haram has caused a steady decline in visitors to Waza National 
Park, Cameroon’s largest game reserve. According to Tourism Ministry spokesman Serge Eric 
Epoune, people used to come in their thousands, but that number has dwindled because people 
fear for their lives. It has therefore threatened the financial infrastructure of Cameroon (Ngala, 
2015). The situation in this subregion has become worrisome; aside from the massive 
socioeconomic implications, the human cost is unquantifiable. It is, even more, disturbing in an 
area that is in dire need of development in all facets of human endeavours. 
 
Curbing Insurgency in the Subregion 
 
Nigeria initially saw the Boko Haram insurgency as a strictly internal problem which it 
thought could be taken care of without external influence. This assertion is not contestable 
considering the political, economic, military and population of the country. But with large 
swathes of many territories falling into the hands of the insurgents, Nigeria had no option but to 
cooperate with the neighboring countries to form the Multi-National Task Force (MNJTF). The 
activities of the sect prompted the subregion to establish the MNJTF, comprising soldiers from 
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Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon as granted by the African Union in February 2016. The 
response of the adjacent countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon was spontaneous as they 
agreed without much persuasion to join in contributing to the MNJTF (Théroux-Bénoni, 2016). 
The MNJTF, with its headquarters in Ndjamena, has been able to canalize the insurgents and 
restrict them within the Sambisa forest as the push against them was on all fronts. The present 
situation sees the fighting deescalating given the successes that the MNJTF has achieved. For 
instance, the cases of bombing have drastically reduced since the line of supply of the insurgents 
had been cut. They now lack food and ammunition, and even communication to the outside 
world seems to have been reduced. Other achievements of the MNJTF include an improvement 
of the security situation as many of the territories hitherto controlled by the insurgents have been 
taken back and people are returning home. One achievement is the recent release of 21 Chibok 
school girls abducted two years ago. 
The activities of the region have received a boost from the international community. The 
United States government in August 2016 offered over $37 million to the Lake Chad Basin for 
humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Regional Coordinator in assessing the situation said 
the region would require at least $559 million in the next four months to ease the crisis in the 
area (Channels Television, October 14, 2016).  
 
 
Panacea for Insurgency in the Subregion 
 
It is a fact of history that development thrives in a peaceful environment. Consequently, 
all hands must be on deck to ensure peace and stem the tide of Boko Haram’s terrorism from 
Nigeria and her neighbors. It is quite evident that this subregion has not fared well in its quest for 
an industrial and technological breakthrough since independence, and this has forced these 
nations to rely on importation for virtually everything; terrorism will only worsen the situation. 
Consequently, it is necessary for governments at all levels to create an enabling environment for 
investment and industrial growth by ensuring the security of lives and property in the country. 
Boko Haram terrorism, which has created palpable fear and a meaningful sense of 
insecurity in the polity and undermined the country’s growth and development, should be tackled 
with all seriousness by the government. Security agencies, especially those concerned with 
intelligence gathering and analysis, must be empowered, motivated, and adequately mobilized to 
combat criminality and insecurity.  
Also, effective legislation that will adequately punish offenders and deter potential 
criminals must be put in place. A situation where criminals are offered amnesty and put on 
bumper payroll will not only undermine security but also encourage more people to enter into 
criminality with the expectations of amnesty and consequent monthly remunerations from the 
government, just for being repentant criminals. An example of this is the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Programme and the proposed offer of amnesty to Boko Haram insurgents (Adebayo, 2014). The 
government can, however, do better by providing social amenities.  
There should be proper coordination of border patrol, and efficient regulation of the 
influx of immigrants among the member nations of the Lake Chad Basin into their countries to 
forestall the recruitment into criminal gangs. The Lake Chad Basin governments should, as a 
matter of urgency, conduct a credible national population census and national identity 
registration to ensure that their nationals are easily identified anywhere they go. 
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There is the need for the government to embark on poverty alleviation programs that will 
impact positively on the lives of the people. The improved physical, social, and psychological 
quality of life of a society and its members, both in a domestic setting and within the larger 
regional and global system, will give the citizens a deeper sense of patriotism. Accordingly, the 
government must introduce elements that have the capacity to provide the citizens with 
economic, social, and political conditions that would ensure happiness and relative prosperity. 
Security awareness should be made inclusive. There should be a massive orientation of all 
citizens, regardless of their level of education, to be aware of the importance of the security of 
the country and ensure they place it above any personal interests. The tranquillity and well-being 
of any society are necessary components of national security.  
The devastating decline of youth unemployment is an issue that needs to be critically 
addressed by the governments of these nations. The generation of employment for the teeming 
population is a critical problem that requires the urgent attention of the government, vigorously 
and aggressively pursued. The engagement of unemployed youths would automatically result in 
depletion in the number of youths always readily available for recruitment into various criminal 
gangs. The inference is that the reduction of youth unemployment will translate to a reduction in 
crime and engender national sustainable development. Youths are an important segment of the 
society, who should be encouraged to channel their energies into productive ventures that can 
lead to national development by being positively engaged in the system and discouraged from 
activities that could be detrimental to the growth of the country. Therefore, every action taken 
towards youth employment is a step towards crime reduction, as well as towards national 
development. 
Governments of the Lake Chad Basin Area must eschew corruption in the fight against 
criminality and insecurity. Overzealous government officials should not squander security 
budgets both at state and federal levels, but rather adequately utilize funds for combating security 
challenges. The citizens regularly paying their taxes and fulfilling other state obligations should 
be well compensated and protected by the state agencies responsible for such tasks. To this 
extent, the current charges against the former National Security Adviser (NSA) to the 
government of Nigeria for involvement in a scandal focusing on the mismanagement of money 
meant for procurement of weapons for fighting the insurgency should not be swept under the 
carpet. 
There must be sincerity on the part of government functionaries to ensure judicious use of 
funds meant for the security of lives and property. The government must address critically and 
pragmatically the issue of the Almajiris in the subregion. However, in recent times they have 
become street urchins and a menace to society. It should be reformed to make the children in the 
system useful to both themselves and society when they grow older. To this end, education must 





The economy of the Lake Chad Basin has been adversely affected by the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Insecurity has been heightened in the subregion as the Islamists scaled up their 
deadly attacks in the area. The insurgency has hampered the once thriving economy and peaceful 
coexistence of the people of the area. It has significantly changed the financial structure of the 
Lake Chad Basin as so much is committed to fighting the insurgency. The subregion has 
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however improved on their cooperation to enhance the security in the area with the formation of 
the MNJTF to fight the insurgents. 
There is need to improve on mutual intelligence that would builds trust among the 
governments of the subregion and could efficiently improve the lives of the people. There is the 
need for an inclusive dialogue that will involve all clans and ethnic groups on security and 
stability in the subregion. The Lake Chad Basin nations, especially Nigeria, need to do more to 
ensure good life for its people. Winning the war against the Boko Haram insurgency therefore 
requires more than military action but providing social amenities that can make life meaningful 
to the people. If governments in this subregion take advantage of the vast human and material 
resources, both military and non-military, financial and social, the Lake Chad Basin will soon 
become a bastion of hope.  
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